So, when can we expect this in cPanel? That post was made in February already, which means it has been working on the other control panels before February. Yet, 3 months later and it's still not available in cPanel* We are working with cPanel to include new version of mod_hostinglimits with SecureLinks enabled in the next EasyApache release.
Got a tip .. changelog apache 2.2.17
Code:*) core: check symlink ownership if both FollowSymlinks and SymlinksIfOwnerMatch are set [Nick Kew] *) core: fix origin checking in SymlinksIfOwnerMatch PR 36783 [Robert L Mathews <rob-apache.org.bugs tigertech.net>]
You should also inform them about the draw backs of the Mod Ruid.There is a current implementation where you can already do this otherwise. If you switch to using mod_ruid2 and setup RDocumentChRoot, it will chroot the user into their directory and symlinks cannot be followed at that point.
See http://forums.cpanel.net/f185/how-p...inks-non-root-users-202242-p2.html#post996441 (direct link to article 54, before_apache_make) - it should reapply the patch whenever you run easyapache ...The question now , is HOW to be sure that this patch will not be overriden by APACHE or CPANEL automatic Updates , any IDEA PLEASE ?
commit 067ede10755d38e4c6502dbfbed3992206d190c0
Author: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Date: Mon Jul 2 18:36:51 2012 -0400
Introduce kernel-enforced SymlinksIfOwnerMatch feature
(Highly desirable feature for webhosting companies)
Conflicts:
fs/namei.c
fs/namei.c | 11 +++++++++++
fs/udf/super.c | 6 +++---
grsecurity/Kconfig | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
grsecurity/grsec_init.c | 6 ++++++
grsecurity/grsec_link.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/grinternal.h | 2 ++
include/linux/grmsg.h | 1 +
include/linux/grsecurity.h | 1 +
security/Kconfig | 11 +++++++++++
10 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Apache's SymlinksIfOwnerMatch option has an inherent race condition │
│ that prevents it from being used as a security feature. As Apache │
│ verifies the symlink by performing a stat() against the target of │
│ the symlink before it is followed, an attacker can setup a symlink │
│ to point to a same-owned file, then replace the symlink with one │
│ that targets another user's file just after Apache "validates" the │
│ symlink -- a classic TOCTOU race. If you say Y here, a complete, │
│ race-free replacement for Apache's "SymlinksIfOwnerMatch" option │
│ will be in place for the group you specify. If the sysctl option │
│ is enabled, a sysctl option with name "enforce_symlinksifowner" is │
│ created.